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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation presents an empirical study of the influence of corporate governance 
structure on the linkage between the performance of direct and indirect real estate market. 
Real estate companies (listed on the Hong Kong stock market or the China stock market) 
that have a core business in direct real estate investment in the mainland were identified. 
The difference in the place of listing will therefore serve as a proxy for corporate 
governance structure. The relationship between direct real estate market and real estate 
companies listed in two places over the period of 1995-2006 are explored. 
 
The findings demonstrate that corporate governance acts as a common factor which 
affects both the performance of direct and indirect real estate market. “The better the 
corporate governance structure the faster and more responsive the price discovery process 
is likely to be between the direct and indirect real estate markets.” The study highlights 
the importance of corporate governance in the linkage and also brings important 
implication to both regulators and institutional investors.
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 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
China has become a major economic force not just in Asia but internationally in recent 
years. Fundamental to this success is its significant economic growth. Foreign investors 
are particularly interested in China’s evolving stock markets. Stock markets were 
established in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990. Research has largely focused on stock 
market volatility (Bailey, 1994; Lee et al, 2001) and stock market anomalies (Wong et al, 
1999; Gao, 2002). The dominance of small-cap stocks and government influence are two 
of the principle problems identified that are proving difficult to deal with. But perhaps 
more importantly, one of the unique features of China stock market is its segmented 
nature (Wo, 1997; Fung et al. 2000). There are two types of share, the A-share, which are 
settled in Renminbi and can only be traded by Chinese citizens and the B-share, which are 
traded in either U.S. or Hong Kong dollars and are on offer to foreign investors. Trading 
in A-shares dominates the China market and they are typically more liquid than B-shares. 
Selected state-owned enterprises can also list on overseas stock markets such as Hong 
Kong, London and New York and an increasing number of what are referred to as 
H-shares have been listed on the Hong Kong’s stock market. This might indicate that 
there is a closer relationship between China’s stock markets and Hong Kong though Hong 
Kong’s stock market developed in a very different way. Hong Kong’s stock market was 
established in 1981 and was classified by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) as a 
developed market enjoying the success of a market oriented economy with a well 
established legal framework in finance and banking (Hsu, 1998). Thus, many fund 
managers have regarded this well-established stock market as an entry gate to the China 
stock market. 
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Research related to real estate markets in China has been largely directed at changes in 
the land tenure system (Walker and Li, 1994; Li, 1997; and Li et al, 2000); China’s 
appraisal procedures (Li, 1995; and Wong, 1998); real estate development processes (Li, 
1996; and Han, 1998) and the dynamics of the office market (Tse et al, 1999; and Webb 
and Tse, 2000). The research has focused on the unique and special characteristics of 
China’s real estate markets.  
 
Real estate markets are conventionally separated into two distinct sub-markets: direct and 
indirect real estate (Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). Investment in direct real estate 
typically can be through the direct ownership of physical assets such as residential, 
commercial or industrial properties. Insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
banks and property companies are the traditional direct real estate investor with their 
increasingly diverse investment portfolios. Individuals and households would also be 
regarded as investors in the direct real estate market. Investment in indirect real estate 
typically can be through owning shares in those companies or corporations who have 
physical assets under investment. The shares of such companies can be either privately 
traded between shareholders or publicly traded on the relevant stock market on which the 
company is listed.. Often the drawback is that few of these companies solely invest in 
property. Many are conglomerates that have diversified their activities to greater or lesser 
degrees for the usual risk spreading reasons. One example is the American International 
Group (AIG) which owns over 50 million square feet of direct real estate globally but it 
that is just a small part of its overall investment portfolio. Property companies and real 
estate investment trusts (REITs) typically are the main investment vehicles for indirect 
real estate. The relative lack of liquidity, high transaction costs and high management 
costs associated with direct real estate have made institutional investors more interested in 
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 indirect real estate (Hoesli et al, 2003 and Chun et al, 2004). 
 
Property investors often perceive investment in indirect real estate as being equivalent to 
investing directly in real estate. However even though a property company may hold a 
large portfolio of direct real estate under investment it does not necessarily mean that 
investors in that company will have the same degree of exposure to the real estate market 
as if they had bought property direct. The linkage between direct and indirect real estate 
investment and the process of price discovery has attracted considerable research in 
recent years. Much of the research has focused on comparing the performance of both 
direct and indirect real estate investment using returns (.Giliberto, 1990; Gyourko and 
Keim, 1992; Myer and Webb, 1993; and Barkham and Geltner, 1995). In Hong Kong and 
China, similar research has been conducted by Newell and Chau (1996); Chau, 
MacGregor and Schwann (2001); and Newell, Chau and Wong (2004); Newell at el 
(2005). The research has clearly indicated that there is a correlation between the 
performance of indirect and direct real estate investment. Indirect real estate returns lead 
direct real estate by anything between one quarter and up to two years. The findings give 
an important signal to institutional investors that investing in indirect real estate has 
certain degree of exposure to the direct real estate. It also helps investors in predicting 
how direct real estate investment is likely to perform. 
 
Arbitrage pricing theory would appear to indicate that common, but unspecified factors 
may influence the performance of direct and indirect real estate (Giliberto, 1990). Much 
of the research has therefore tended to focus on the existence of this relationship between 
direct and indirect real estate. One unspecified factor that has attracted some attention 
relates to the issue of “Corporate Governance”. Corporate Governance is the set of 
processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is 
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 directed, administered or controlled (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Research has been 
carried out on the effect of corporate governance on the performance of different forms of 
indirect real estate investment such as REITs (Feng et al, 2005; Hartzell et al, 2006). The 
suggestion therefore is that Corporate Governance could be a critical factor in 
understanding or determining the linkage between direct and indirect real estate.  
 
This dissertation is therefore an attempt to study the possibility of such a linkage. The 
uniqueness of the situation here in Hong Kong where many mainland companies are 
listed combined with the rapidly developing situation in the mainland’s real estate 
markets and the fact that the mainland has two established stock markets in their own 
right provides an equally unique opportunity for such a study. Real estate companies that 
have a core business in direct real estate investment in the mainland will be identified. 
Those real estate companies listed on the Hong Kong stock market will be compared to 
those listed on the mainland’s stock market. The difference in the place of listing will 
therefore serve as a proxy for corporate governance structure. The relationship between 
direct real estate investment in China and Hong Kong listed companies and mainland 
listed companies can then be explored.  
 
The findings of this study could have significant implications for both mainland and 
Hong Kong stock market regulators as well as owners of corporations and foreign 
investors particularly the institutional investor. 
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 1.2. Objectives 
 
In order to undertake this study, a number of objectives have been established: 
 
1. To define the direct and indirect real estate markets and explore the issue of price 
discovery. 
 
2. To examine the evolutionary stages of both the direct and indirect real estate markets 
in China. 
 
3. To investigate the differences in corporate governance requirements between China’s 
stock markets and Hong Kong’s stock market 
 
4. To analyze whether any correlation can be established between the  direct and 
indirect real estate markets under the two sets of corporate governance structures. 
 
5. To consider the implications of the results 
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 1.3. Scope of Study 
 
In order to provide a focus for the work and establish some boundaries the following 
hypothesis has been articulated: 
 
‘The better the corporate governance structure the faster and more responsive the price 
discovery process is likely to be between the direct and indirect real estate markets.’  
 
In order to examine this, a comparative analysis will be carried out. Companies with their 
core business in real estate investment in the mainland will be selected. Two categories of 
property companies will be distinguished according to their place of listing: Mainland 
China (the focus) and Hong Kong (as a control). The linkage between the mainland’s 
direct and indirect markets will then be compared with the linkage between the 
mainland’s direct market and those mainland real estate companies listed in Hong Kong.. 
The underlying assets in both cases will be located in the mainland. Both types of 
companies will therefore be subject to the same set of economic and social factors. This 
will ensure that they share the same real estate risk associated with mainland investment 
the only exception being the place of listing, which will serve as a proxy for the corporate 
governance structure. This in turn means that the variables affecting any linkage will be 
constant except the variable of corporate governance structure. 
 
Methodology 
 
A simple correlation analysis will be carried out in order to test whether direct real estate 
performance in the mainland is more correlated with the performance of property 
companies listed in Hong Kong than those listed on China’s own markets. 
 6
  
Cross Correlation Tests and Granger Causality Tests (Granger,1969; Greene,2000) will be 
performed in order to test the lead-lag relationship between the performance of direct real 
estate and the performance of these two types of property companies.  
 
Previous studies by Ling and Naranjo (1999), Booth and Marcato (2004) investigated the 
linkage between direct and indirect real estate markets using a multi-factor model which 
included equity market factors. This study will adopt the approach used by Clayton et al 
(2003) again using a multi-factor model which used the following equation to examine 
the linkage between the performance of the direct and indirect real estate sectors: 
 
Indirect real estate = f (stock, bond, direct real estate) + idiosyncratic component 
 
After estimation using regression, variance decomposition is applied to explain how much 
of the performance of indirect real estate can be explained by the performance of direct 
real estate. 
 
Data Description 
 
Direct real estate performance in the mainland is represented by the returns to price 
indices of major office real estate markets which have been constructed and made 
available by private real estate consultant companies. 
 
The indirect real estate performance of Hong Kong listed property companies can be 
represented by the returns to the real estate companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Similarly the indirect real estate performance of China property companies can 
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 be captured by the returns to the real estate companies listed on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
 
The stock performance will be represented by the returns to both the SSE and SZSE A 
shares indices. The bond performance will be represented by the returns to U.S. Treasury 
Bills. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of this dissertation 
 
In this study, there are a total of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to 
the study including its background, objectives, hypothesis, the importance and a simple 
explanation of methodology and data. 
 
Chapter 2 is a general overview of both the stock markets and real estate markets in China 
and Hong Kong. It also provides a review of the literature with regard to the theoretical 
background and previous studies related to the price discovery process and the linkages 
between the direct and indirect real estate sectors, corporate governance as well as the 
differences in corporate governance structures in the mainland and Hong Kong. A review 
of methodological issues is also provided. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses the differences in corporate governance structure in the mainland and 
Hong Kong.  
 
Chapter 4 describes in detail the methodologies adopted in the research namely 
Correlation Analysis, Granger Causality Test, Multi-factor model and Variance 
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 decomposition together with the relevant statistical tools. Sampling and data collection 
associated with the tests are discussed and a detailed description of the data is provided. 
 
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the empirical results together with tentative 
explanations.   
 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the findings, some conclusions that might be 
drawn together with limitations of this study and possible directions for future studies.  
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 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. General definition of direct and indirect real estate market 
 
Real estate markets are conventionally separated into two distinct sub-markets: direct and 
indirect real estate (Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). Investment in direct real estate 
typically can be through the direct ownership of physical assets such as residential, 
commercial or industrial properties. Investment in direct real estate involves the 
acquisition and management of the actual physical asset which was regarded as a direct 
exposure to the direct real estate market (CISDM, 2006). Insurance companies, pension 
funds, investment banks and property companies are the traditional direct real estate 
investors with their increasingly diverse investment portfolios. Individuals and 
households would also be regarded as investors in the direct real estate market. Lack of 
liquidity, high transactions costs, and high management costs are the most common 
characteristics of the direct real estate market. (Hoesli et al, 2003; Chun et al, 2004). 
“Transaction” in real estate can be individually complex, prolonged and distinctive 
(Seabrooke et al, 2004). The transaction process can be extended over weeks or months 
which greatly reduces the liquidity of investing in the direct real estate market. Upon the 
complicated legal process associated with transaction of properties, searching information, 
bargaining and negotiating agreements would also incur transaction costs. Management 
of the property enhances its performance as well as its value. Modern real estate 
management includes corporate real-estate management, facilities management and 
building operation management which are all costly. Thus, institutional investors are 
more likely to invest in indirect real estate markets.  
 
Brett (1983) gave a definition of investment in indirect real estate markets. The indirect 
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 route in investing in real estate can be through property company shares, property unit 
linked life assurance schemes (so-called ‘property bonds’), mortgages and debentures. 
Hoesli and MacGregor (2000) gave a more clear definition of it. Investment in indirect 
real estate typically can be through owning shares in those companies or corporations 
who have physical assets under investment (e.g. insurance companies, pension funds, 
investment banks, property companies and real estate investment trusts REITs). The 
shares of such companies can be either privately traded between shareholders or publicly 
traded on the relevant stock market on which the company is listed. Often the drawback is 
that few of these companies solely invest in property due to ‘conglomeration’. 
Conglomeration is one of the major financial developments in recent years. It means 
diversifying the company’s investment portfolio into different sectors to greater or lesser 
degrees for the usual risk spreading reasons (Morrison, 2005). Property companies and 
real estate investment trusts typically are the main investment vehicles for indirect real 
estate. Issac (1994) explained the comparative advantages of investment in indirect real 
estate. It reduces the transaction costs and management costs incurred by the physical 
assets. It also increases the liquidity of the investor as the shares can be easily traded in 
the stock market within a short period. This makes it like a market-led style of equity 
shares rather than asset-led of direct property (Mallinson, 1988). Thus, it brings the 
question that whether investing in indirect real estate markets can help the investors to 
expose to the direct real estate market. 
 
2.2. Relationship between direct and indirect real estate market 
 
Property investors often perceive investment in indirect real estate as being equivalent to 
investing directly in real estate (Giliberto, 1990). However even though a property 
company may hold a large portfolio of direct real estate under investment it does not 
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 necessarily mean that investors in that company will have the same degree of exposure to 
the real estate market as if they had bought direct property. There is a notion that the 
indirect real estate returns are derived from some unspecified fundamental factor(s) which 
also affect the returns to the direct real estate market.  
 
Giliberto (1990) explained the existence of these unspecified factors by using the 
Arbitrage pricing theory1. There should be common, but unspecified factors that may 
influence the returns to both direct and indirect real estate markets. If such common 
factors present, there should be a correlation between them. Barkharm and Geltner (1995) 
explained the relationship between direct real estate market and indirect real estate market 
using the concept of ‘price discovery’. Price discovery is a process regarding the 
information aggregation and market participant’s opinion about the value of the asset. 
 
When assets whose values are related to one another are traded in different markets, 
the price discovery of the component of the value which is common across the assets 
may occur in one market, from which the relevant value information is then 
transmitted to second market. (Barkham and Geltner, 1995:1) 
 
Barkharm and Geltner (1995) used commercial properties as an example of the ‘assets’. 
Commercial properties are publicly and indirectly traded in the form of real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) or property company shares on the respective stock market. 
Similarly, the commercial properties are also privately traded in the direct real estate 
market. There should be a common factor that affects both the direct and indirect real 
estate performance. The price discovery process is that the value information which 
                                                 
1 Ross, S. 1976a. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic 
Theory 13, 341–60. 
Ross, S. 1976b. Risk, return and arbitrage. Risk Return in Finance ed. I. Friend and 
J. Bicksler, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
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 affects the values of the assets is transmitted from the indirect real estate market to the 
direct real estate market, or vice versa. 
 
Institutional investments in the indirect real estate market in the 1990s are different from 
that before 1990 (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Ghosh and Sirmans, 1997). Both have 
reported that the institutional investors were more active in the indirect real estate market. 
This was due to the reason of considerable research at that time indicating that there is a 
correlation between the indirect and direct real estate market. The findings of this area can 
give an important message to institutional investors that investing in indirect real estate 
has a certain degree of exposure to direct real estate. It also helps investors in predicting 
how direct real estate investment is likely to perform. Thus, considerable research has 
been done in the relationship between the direct and indirect real estate markets  
 
Giliberto (1990) examined the linkage between direct and indirect real estate markets in 
the United States. The relationship between the real estate returns (returns to both 
Russell-NCREIF (RN) Property Index) and the financial asset returns (returns to National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), bond market and stock market) 
are examined by the regression model. The result found that the residuals from regression 
of both real estate series on financial assets returns are significantly correlated. This 
supports the notion that there should be common, but unspecified factors that may 
influence the returns to both direct and indirect real estate markets. 
 
Gyourko and Keim (1992) analyzed the risks and returns of different types of real 
estate-related firms traded on the New York and American stock exchanges (NYSE and 
AMEX). The relationship between real estate stock portfolio returns and returns on a 
standard appraisal-based index have been established. It explained the lead-lag 
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 relationship between the direct and indirect real estate market. The stock market reflects 
information about real estate markets that is later transmitted to direct real estate market.  
 
Myer and Webb (1993) extended the research of Giliberto (1990) concerning the 
relationship between direct real estate returns and REITs by using a simple vector 
autoregressive model and Granger causality tests. The REITs returns are more correlated 
to the direct real estate returns than the returns of stock and closed-end funds. Also, the 
result proved that the REITs returns are Granger cause to the direct real estate returns as it 
incorporate the information more quickly. The study established the lead-lag relationship 
between the direct and indirect real estate markets in the United State.  
 
Barkham and Geltner (1995) explained the relationship between the returns to 
commercial properties market and the returns to REITs and property company shares in 
the United States and United Kingdom by the concept of price discovery. The results 
indicated that the value information will firstly occur in the indirect real estate market 
then transmit to the direct real estate market up to a year. This further supports the 
argument that there should be a linkage between the direct and indirect real estate 
markets.  
 
Newell and Chau (1996) examined the direct and indirect linkage between direct and 
indirect real estate markets in Hong Kong. The performances of listed property companies 
were compared with the performance of the direct real estate market in Hong Kong. The 
research covered the period from 1984 to 1994. This ensured to covering the full property 
cycle in Hong Kong. The correlation and the price discovery process and the level of the 
dependency were also found. The major finding was that there is one quarter lead by 
property stocks over the property market. Newell et al (2004) extended the result of 
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 Newell and Chau (1996) concerning the linkages over a longer period of time from 1984 
to 2000. The result is consistent with the previous one.  
 
Newell at el (2005) investigated the linkage between the performances of listed property 
companies and office market in China over the 1995 to 2002 period. The performance of 
property companies was Granger cause the performance of office market. There is 
evidence of a leading relationship by the Shenzhen property company and Guangzhou 
office market up to three quarters and Shenzhen office market up to four quarters.  
 
To conclude, all these research support the argument that there is a correlation between 
the performance of direct and indirect real estate investment. Indirect real estate returns 
generally lead direct real estate returns by anything between one quarter and up to two 
years.  
 
2.3. China Stock Market and Hong Kong Stock Market 
 
One of the unique features of the China stock market is its segmented nature (Wo, 1997; 
Fung et al, 2000). They both gave a general overview of the market segmentation in 
China Stock market. There are two types of share, the A-share, which are settled in 
Renminbi and can only be traded by Chinese citizens and the B-share, which are traded in 
either U.S. or Hong Kong dollars and are offer to foreign investors. Only a small number 
of qualified foreign institutional investors are allowed to invest in A-Shares (E.g. UBS, 
ING, Deutsche, HSBC, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan etc). Trading in 
A-shares dominates the China market and they are typically more liquid than B-shares. 
Fung and Leung (2002) used the asset pricing model to examine the pricing of the A and 
B Shares in the China Stock Market. They investigated the A and B shares of the same 
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 companies and indicated that the two-tier markets are loosely related. This further 
confirmed that the two-tier markets are separate and have little correlation between them.  
 
Apart from the market segmentation, Gao (2002) highlighted the characteristics of the 
China markets in detail. Firstly, the China stock market is dominated by small-capital 
stocks. There are very few stocks that fit the definition of “blue-chip” listed on the China 
stock market. Comparatively, developed markets like the Hong Kong stock market are 
dominated by numbers of larger-capital stocks. This feature results in increased 
speculation and high turnover in the China stock market. The current structure of the 
China stock market influences its further development. Secondly, the China stock market 
expends by issuing the new shares in the market rather than increasing the value of the 
existing stocks. Companies listed on the China stock market are plagued by poor earnings 
and low dividend yields. The way of expansion further increases the numbers of the 
small-cap stocks and results in market manipulation. Thirdly, government has too much 
control on the stock market. There is a tight control on the issuance of initial public 
offerings (IPO) and this greatly increases the numbers of the state-owned Enterprises on 
the stock market. Thus, many listed companies have a very low free-float rate. 
Furthermore, selected state-owned enterprises can also list on overseas stock markets 
such as Hong Kong, London and New York and an increasing number of what are 
referred to as H-shares have been listed on Hong Kong stock market. Moreover, Hang 
Seng Index Services Limited announced to include H-shares in the Hang Seng Index. The 
SFC has conducted the research about this and the findings showed that the market has 
responded positively to this decision (SFC, 2006)2. This might indicate that there is a 
closer relationship between China’s stock markets and Hong Kong. 
                                                 
2 “Inclusion of H-shares in the HSI and Possible Impact on the Market”, Research Department, Supervision of Markets 
Division1,the SFC, August 2006 
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Hong Kong was classified by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) as a developed 
market enjoying the success of a market oriented economy with a well established legal 
framework in finance and banking (Hsu, 2006). As a developed market, Hong Kong was 
dominated by numbers of “blue-chip” which constitute over half of the market 
capitalization3. This greatly reduces the market manipulation and speculation. This makes 
the overall stock market of Hong Kong more stabilized. Furthermore, the government of 
Hong Kong greatly adopts the theory of the free market form Friedman4. The role of the 
Hong Kong government is ensuring the economic and political freedom. It was the major 
different between Hong Kong stock market and the China stock market. Hong Kong 
government would not actively invest in or hold the shares of the listed companies in the 
stock market. There would be not much influence of the government on the stock market. 
 
2.4. Real Estate Market in Mainland China 
 
Seabrooke et al (2004) gave a general review on the revolutionary stages of real estate 
markets in Mainland China. Before the 1980s there was no market mechanism for the 
transfer of real estate. Land was either owned by state or held in collective ownership by 
village communities. As the rapid urban development started in the many cities in China 
in the 1980s, most of the collectively owned land has been retained by the government. 
The government leased the land to investors, developers or end-users and they paid a 
premium back to the government for the exchange of the ownership for certain period of 
time. This was the starting of the real estate development of China in the privatization 
process of the socialist economics. 
                                                 
3 “Quality of the Hong Kong Market – A Critical Review”, the SFC, 12 December 2001. 
4 Capitalism and freedom / Milton Friedman ; with the assistance of Rose D. Friedman ; with a new preface by the 
author. IMPRINT Chicago ; London : University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
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Because of the rapid development of the Mainland China, the real estate sectors had been 
attracted a large amount of foreign investors. Most of the foreign investments in real 
estate sector are classified as direct real estate investment (Tse, 2000). The capital market 
of Mainland China is still undeveloped. There were only few real estate companies 
issuing B-shares on the stock market which can be easily accessed by the foreign 
investors. Thus, the investors have no choice except direct investment in real estate 
market. Joint Venture with local companies became the only possible way for the foreign 
direct investment.  
 
Walker and Li (1994) and Li (1997) highlighted the change of land tenure of Mainland 
China. Li (1996) explained the process of joint ventures real estate development in 
Mainland China. The foreign investor has to be forming partnerships between local 
companies in order to develop the land in Mainland China. Typically, the foreign partner 
would arrange for development funds, prepare payment for land premium, infrastructure 
costs and resettlement fees. The Chinese partner would focus on obtaining land use rights 
through other administrative channels or market channels. Then the land use rights would 
be transferred to the formed Joint venture and the construction process would be started. 
The Joint Venture system encourages the cooperation of the foreign and local companies 
in China since JV is the only way for foreign investors exploring the real estate 
development sectors in Mainland China. 
 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Tianjin were designated to be “The Special 
Economic Zones Office” under the state council in April 1987. A new policy for the 
transferability of land use rights by using the free market was proposed in these areas. 
The land tenure systems of these areas were under the Concept of lease. (Webb and Li, 
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 2000). Foreign investment tends to be concentrated in a few large cities in the coastal 
region such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing (Li et al, 1999). Office markets in these 
areas have become significantly important from the view of foreign investors. 
 
Recently, the Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Commerce, State Economic 
Development and Reform Commission, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) jointly 
announced the “Opinions on Regulating Market Access and Administration of Foreign 
Investment in the Real Estate Market” on 11 July 2006 (Wong, 2006). The Opinions set 
out new rules regulating foreign direct investments in order to cool down the 
“over-heated” real estate market in Mainland China. It significantly affects the individuals 
and institutional investors as well as REITs. The main issues can be summarized as 
follows: increasing the purchasers’ requirement, onshore entity requirement and 
borrowing restriction. These constraints further reduce the foreign investment in the direct 
real estate sector of Mainland China. The remedy of the foreign investors was to invest in 
the indirect real estate markets. 
 
2.5. General definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Coase (1937) established the fundamental concept of the formation of the firm. He 
introduced the notion of transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are 
founded and how they continue to behave. The clear concept of the formation of the firm 
introduced the starting of the searches in this area. Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) gave a brief definition of Agency Theory and introduced agency problem that 
occurs when cooperating parties have different objectives. Agency Theory concerns and 
solves the problems from the agency relationship that exists when one party (the principal) 
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 and other parties (the agent) perform a task. The principal can seem as the “Owner” of the 
corporation while the agent can be regarded as the “Manager”. 
 
Agency Theory was then later divided into two streams (Jensen, 1983). One is Positivist 
Agency Theory and the other is Principal-Agent Research. Positivist Agency Theory 
mainly focuses on identifying the conflict between the principal and agent and makes 
suggestion to the governance mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983) is one of the articles 
related to the Positivist Agency Theory. The article mentioned the role of the directors in 
the Board and how they can monitor their managers. Principal- Agent Research provided 
a more logical deduction and mathematical proof when compared with the Positivist 
Agency Theory. The principal- agent research focuses on determining the optimal 
contract and outcome between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Most of our 
knowledge of Corporate Governance was largely derived from the Agency Theory. 
Governance problems often originate from the separation of owner and control within a 
firm or business organization.  
 
“……the separation of ownership and management has clear advantages. It allows 
share ownership to change without interfering with the operation of the business. It 
allows the film to hire professional managers. It allows the firm to hire professional 
managers. But it also brings problems if the managers’ and owner’s objectives 
differ.” Brealey and Mayers (2000; p6) 
 
Thus, Corporate Governance was established to allow various parties to contribute capital, 
expertise and labour, to maximize benefits for all (Monks, 2001).  
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 2.6. Definition of Corporate Governance in the modern economy 
 
In the modern economy, Corporate Governance relates to a wide variety of “stakeholders”, 
“participants” or “constituents” which includes its shareholders, directors, managers, 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, market intermediaries, auditors, regulators, 
the government, as well as local community. The first three items can be regarded as the 
primary stakeholders or participants since they directly affect the performance of the 
companies. Corporate Governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development5  OECD (1998) defined Corporate Governance as a system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled. In a narrow sense, it is the relationship 
between the primary participants in determining the directions and performance of 
corporations. In a broader sense, it delineates the rights and responsibilities of each 
primary stakeholder and the design of institutions and the mechanisms that induce or 
control board of directors and management to strike for the best interest of the 
stakeholders. Ho (2003) tried to categorize the sources of forces shaping a company’s 
corporate governance into internal and external control. Internal Controls include 
functions of ownership structure, the composition of the board, the shareholder’s general 
meeting, financial reporting, disclosure policies, internal codes, rules, and procedures etc. 
External Controls are mainly concerned with the guidelines, standards, regulations of the 
market. OECD (2003) further explained a good Corporate Governance should focus on 
five universal principles: (i) the right of shareholders (the protection and ability to 
influence decisions); (ii) the equitable treatment of shareholders; (iii) the role of 
                                                 
5 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a unique forum where the governments of 
30 market democracies work together to address the economic, social and governance challenges of globalisation as 
well as to exploit its opportunities. 
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 stakeholders; (iv) disclosure and transparency and (v) the responsibilities of the board. 
These five principles would act as criteria to distinguish between good or bad corporate 
governance.  
 
2.7. Implication of corporate governance in the indirect real estate market 
 
OECD (2003) emphasized that a good Corporate Governance can make contribution to 
the companies in building market confidence and encouraging the foreign investors to 
invest in the companies which bring a more stable and long term international investment 
flow. It is generally believed that companies with better corporate governance have better 
growth prospects, and are less vulnerable to market downturns (Chow, 2002). Research 
has been carried out on the effect of corporate governance on the performance of different 
forms of indirect real estate investment such as REITs.  
 
Firday and Sirmans (1998) examined the influence of corporate governance on the 
performance of the real estate investment trusts (REITs). The study followed the idea 
from Fama and Jensen (1983) that outside directors provide a means to monitor 
management activities through an increased focus on firm performance because they have 
an incentive to maximize the value of their human capital by maintaining their reputation 
for being effective monitors. Thus, the study hypothesized that an increased number of 
outside director representation would result in a better performance. The study 
investigated the influence of board of director composition and characteristics on REIT 
shareholder wealth as measured by firm market-to-book ratios. Results supported the 
hypothesis and showed that there is a positive relationship between market-to-book ratios 
and the number of outside director representation. 
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 Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) regarded the ownership structure as the major corporate 
governance’s factor and investigated its impact on the performance of REITs. The 
research examined the relationship between the board composition and REIT 
performance. The result further supported the conclusion of Firday and Sirmans (1998). 
Positive correlation between them has been discovered by using four regression models. 
The higher independence of the director of the Board would result in a better REIT 
performance. Feng et al (2005) extended the research from above by using an alternative 
approach to re-examine the impact of board structure on REIT performance. A board 
index has been constructed in order to assess the corporate governance level of the board. 
The smaller size, larger numbers of outside directors and not chaired by the CEO would 
regarded to be good governance. The findings indicated that those companies with a 
better board would performance better than the others. And the results are significant in 
the case of best and worst boards among the samples.  
 
To conclude, the results of such research help to establish that corporate governance have 
deep impact on the company’s performance especially in the indirect real estate sector 
such as REITs.  
 
2.8. Methodological Review 
 
In the previous literature, Giliberto (1990); Gyourko and Keim (1992) found the 
correlation between the indirect and indirect real estate by using regression model. Myer 
and Webb (1993); Barkham and Geltner (1995); Newell and Chau (1996); and Newell at 
el (2005) all used the Granger Causality Tests to further examine the relationship between 
direct and indirect real estate market.  
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 Correlation tests and Granger Causality Tests seem to be the usual ways to investigate the 
linkage between direct and indirect real estate market. Granger (1969) investigated the 
causality relations by the cross-spectral methods which can help to explain the 
relationship between two sets of variables. Granger Causality Tests can find which 
variable is causing the other or vice verse. Granger (1969) also gave four definitions of 
the casual relations. They are Causality, Feedback, Instantaneous Causality, and Causality 
Lag. The definition of Causality is focusing on the predictability of some series. If series 
A contains the information in past terms that helps to predict the series B and the 
information is not used in the other series, that series A is said to be causing the series B. 
It was a useful tool in determining the causality relationship between two variables. 
  
Previous studies by Ling and Naranjo(1999), Booth and Marcato (2004) investigated the 
linkage between direct and indirect real estate markets using a multi-factor model which 
included equity market factors. Clayton et al (2003) again used a multi-factor model 
which used the following equation to examine the linkage between the performance of the 
direct and indirect real estate sectors: 
 
Indirect real estate = f (stock, bond, direct real estate) + idiosyncratic component 
 
Orthogonalization has been undergone in order to obtain “pure” factors in this equation. 
After estimation using regression, variance decomposition is applied to explain how much 
of the performance of indirect real estate can be explained by the performance of direct 
real estate. It provides an alternative way to investigate the relationship between the direct 
and indirect real estate sector with addition of quality market factors. 
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 3. Differences in corporate governance structures in Mainland China 
and Hong Kong 
 
3.1. Legal and regulatory framework of disclosure and transparency: 
 
Fama (1970) mentioned that separation of the management and ownership would create 
the information asymmetry. Mangers can access more information of the company 
because of his duty. Thus, manager may try to maximize his self–utility even from the 
expenses of the owners. Owners or shareholders would intend to monitor the manager’s 
misbehavior by looking at the accounting and financial reporting. Thus, disclosure of the 
accounting and financial reports has been one of the important information for those 
shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In the OECD (2003), “disclosure” and 
“transparency” was regarded as one of the five important factors of the corporate 
governance. In the previous experience from developed countries, information disclosure 
and transparency is the essential substances for an effective functioning capital market. 
Manipulated or misleading financial reporting would hinder the serious financial 
weakness of the listed companies and it will bring serious negative impact on the 
operation of a fair capital market. Thus, regulations and ordinances of corporate discourse 
become necessary to protect the interests of public investors and market participants 
(Taylor and Turley, 1986; Amir et al., 1993).  
 
Hsu (1998) give a brief introduction to the regulatory framework of information 
disclosure and transparency in Hong Kong. The disclosure requirements for publicly 
listed companies in Hong Kong consist of two categories, i.e. ``compulsory'' and 
``voluntary.'' The compulsory disclosure requirements for all listed companies in Hong 
Kong, at present, come from four major sources: (i) The Companies Ordinance; (ii) The 
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 Rules of Disclosures formulated by the Securities and Commodities Futures Commission; 
(iii) The Rules of Listing and Trading enforced by the Hong Kong Joint Stock 
Exchange;(iv) The accounting standards or guidelines (e.g. Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practices) formulated by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA). 
The voluntary part refers to practices of the market participants. Table 3.1 presents the 
existing regulatory framework on accounting and financial reporting of the listed 
companies in Hong Kong.  
 
Lin and Wang (2001) outlined the regulatory framework for corporate reporting in China. 
The China government has paid increasing attention to regulating accounting and 
information disclosure for the securities markets. Hierarchical legal structure has been 
discovered in monitoring the information disclosure of the listed companies. On the top of 
the hierarchy are the state laws or business legislations which have the statutory power 
(e.g. The Company Law, The Securities Law, etc.). China State Securities Committee 
(CSSC) under the State Council and the State Supervisory Commission of Securities 
(SSCS) have imposed some governmental regulations for stock companies and securities 
transactions (e.g. The Provisional Regulations on Stock Issuing and Trading and 
Provisional Measures on Prohibition of Falsification in Securities Transactions). The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have also set up certain detailed 
rules on information disclosures of the listed companies. In addition, the Ministry of 
Finance (governmental authority in charge of accounting and financing work) has 
formulated and enforced specific regulations or standards for accounting and information 
disclosure of the listed companies. Table 3.2 presents the existing regulatory framework 
on accounting and financial reporting of the listed companies in China.  
 
Ho (1998) supported the argument that the enforcement of, and compliance with the 
 26
 compulsory accounting and reporting standards by the listed companies in Hong Kong are 
much more mature than that of Mainland China due to the longer history of the 
establishment. Lin and Wang (2001) studied the financial disclosure and accounting 
system between Hong Kong and China by three case studies of the companies. It 
examined the financial reports of the three companies listed simultaneously as H-shares in 
Hong Kong and A-shares in Mainland China. The study demonstrated the significant 
discrepancies exist in the financial information disclosed under the accounting and 
reporting rules between two places. The study also reported that there was a substantial 
gap between the practices of corporate accounting and reporting in China and the 
internationally accepted norms. In their findings, there was a general problem of shortage 
of information. The financial data in the reports of A-shares companies is lesser than that 
of H-shares companies. Thus, insufficient information is available for the most foreign 
investors of Chinese companies. 
 
“This may indicate that most Chinese listed companies have not applied the 
full-disclosure principle in their financial reporting. The understandability of 
financial information disclosed by Chinese companies is far from satisfactory at 
present, has insufficient information is available in their financial reports.” (Lin and 
Wang, 2001; p272) 
 
Particularly in the real estate sector, Liow et al (2005) conducted a research on the level 
of corporate disclosure of the property companies in Asian Countries. It followed the 
Brounen et al (2001) approach to develop the “information transparency score” to assess 
the targeted companies in Asian. There are total 27 criteria in assessing the information 
transparency of property companies which included annual report transparency, corporate 
website clarity and analyst coverage. It selected 350 property companies and finally 
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 assessed 180 property companies from Ten Asian Countries which included the Hong 
Kong (36 companies) and Mainland China (8 companies). The overall score of Hong 
Kong (52.6) was nearly double of Mainland China (26.8). The result indicated that the 
level of information transparency of the property companies in Hong Kong is higher than 
that of the property companies in Mainland China. Jones Lang Lasalle had published the 
Real Estate Transparency Index in the year 2006. The study conducted a real estate 
market transparency survey by using a structured questionnaire guided by teams of 
regional coordinators. The survey regarded the following five attributes of real estate 
transparency: (i) Availability of investment performance indexes; (ii) Availability of 
market fundamentals data; (iii) Listed vehicle financial disclosure and governance; (iv) 
Regulatory and legal factors; (v) Professional and ethical standards. Transparency Index 
was compiled from the results of the 15 major questions. The composite scores range 
between 1.00 and 5.00. Hong Kong property companies (scored 1.3) were benchmarked 
as high transparency one while Mainland China property companies (scored 3.5) were 
benchmarked as low transparency one. The two research both indicated that Hong Kong 
listed real estate companies are with a higher level of information disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
To conclude, the enforcement of, and compliance with the compulsory legislation of 
disclosure and transparency by the listed companies in Hong Kong are so far at a 
satisfactory level compared with that of the companies listed in Mainland China.  
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 3.2. Composition and responsibilities of the board 
 
The second main difference in corporate governance structure between the companies in 
Mainland China and Hong Kong is the composition of the board and its responsibilities. 
The listed companies of Hong Kong are mostly owned by the private owners. However, 
most of the shares of Mainland-listed companies are state-owned. There are fewer outside 
directors in the board. Thus, most of the decisions of the board are controlled by the 
government. Feng et al (2005) analyzed the relationship between the board structure and 
the performance of companies by using the REITs as an example. The findings indicated 
that good boards (with majority of outside directors) are associated with superior average 
performance. 
 
Zhou and Wang (2000) highlighted the differences between private companies and the 
state-owned companies and introduced the problem of these companies in China by using 
the concept of Agency Cost. In the Agency Theory, the agency cost can be defined as the 
difference between the profit of a firm running by an owner-manger and the same firm 
running by an appointed agent. Generally, the state-owned companies would create a 
larger agency cost and the reasons are as follows: 
 
Chinese listed companies are intrinsically different from private enterprises (Zhang, 1999; 
Zhou and Wang, 2000). The managers of the former are directly appointed by their 
superior government official. The politician can manipulate the listed companies’ 
behavior through the managers that they appointed. In some circumstances, the mangers 
just need to satisfy the requirement of those politicians in stead of maximizing the overall 
profits of the firm. And this may be one of the reasons explaining why those listed 
companies on the China stock market are poor earnings and low dividend yields (Gao, 
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 2002). Secondly, those state–owned companies are not free market players, but instead 
are more like government agencies. According to Li (1996), most of the investment 
decisions of these companies are heavily intervened by governments. The government has 
to concern more than a normal owner in the process of investment decision. Social burden 
and policy burden are making the government in a dilemma. Thus, the decisions of these 
companies are usually not profit maximizing. Thirdly, there is no incentive contract 
between the Managers and the owner (state) in Chinese listed companies. Salaries of the 
appointed managers are base on ranking in stead of their performance. Managers are 
assigned official ranks in the hierarchy of the civil service, with the ranks based on the 
size of the enterprise (which in many cases is judged by the sales volume). This would 
affect the performance of the manager because of the human beings. If the manager is 
aligned interests with the owners, they would more likely to put more effort and result in 
a better performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mentioned that incentive contracts 
between the managers and owners can induce the manager to act in investors’ interest and 
result in better performance of the firm. Incentive contract can be in the form of share 
ownership, stock options or a dismissal if income is low. In contrary, private companies in 
Hong Kong mostly used the incentive contract to hire the manager while the listed 
companies in Mainland China would never do so. The difference of this induces the 
problem of a higher agency cost and reduces the performance of the state-owned 
companies.  
 
To conclude, the corporate governance of listed companies in Hong Kong and Mainland 
China are different. Composition of Board of directors is also different due to the nature 
of the ownership in shares. The listed companies of Hong Kong are mostly owned by 
private owners, while most of the shares of Mainland-listed companies are state-owned. 
The difference would affect the performance of the appointed managers as well as the 
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performance of the companies. The private owned companies would more likely making 
an aligned interest between the managers and the owners (shareholders). If the manager’s 
interest is aligned with the shareholders, the company or the organization would have a 
better performance and vice versa. Thus, listed companies in Hong Kong have better 
corporate governance structure in solving the problem of the separation of ownership and 
management.  
 
 Table 3.1 Regulations governing financial disclosure of listed companies in Hong Kong 
 
Regulations governing financial disclosure of listed companies in Hong 
Kong 
   
Sources  Items Effective date 
Laws of Hong Kong CAP 32 The Companies Ordinance 1-Jul-1933 
Laws of Hong Kong CAP 571 Securities and Futures Ordinance 1-Apr-2003 
Securities and Futures Commission The Rules of Disclosures N/A 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (Exchange) The Rules of Listing and Trading N/A 
Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) 
 
The accounting standards or guidelines (e.g. Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practices) 
N/A 
Source:Hsu, B., Arner D., Tse M., and Johnstone S.(2006) 
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Regulations governing financial disclosure of listed companies in China     
Sources  Items Effective date 
The Securities Law 1-Jul-99 The Standing Committee, National Peoples' Congress 
 The Company Law 1-Jul-94 
The Provisional Regulations on Stock Issuing and Trading 22-Apr-93 State Securities Committee, The State Council (SSC) 
 Provisional Measures on Prohibition of Falsification in Securities Transactions 15-Aug-93 
Detailed Rules on Information Disclosures of the Publicly Listed companies 10-Jun-93 China Securities Supervisory Commission (CSSC) 
 Rules on the Disclosure Content and Format No. 1-7 Since 1995 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) 1-Jul-93 
Accounting System for Stock Companies (amended 1994, 1998) 1-Jul-92 
The Ministry of Finance 
 
 Practical (Detailed) Accounting Standards Since 1997-1998 
Guidelines on Information Disclosures of the Listed Companies Since 1990 Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 Guidelines on the Operation of the Listed companies Since 1995 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Rules on Information Disclosures of the Listed Companies Since 1993 
Lin. Z. J.and Wang L.(2001) 
Table 3.2 Regulations governing financial disclosure of listed companies in China 
 
 
 
 4. Hypothesis, Methodology and Data 
 
4.1. Hypothesis 
 
In order to provide a focus for the work and establish some boundaries the following 
hypothesis has been articulated: 
 
‘The better the corporate governance structure the faster and more responsive the price 
discovery process is likely to be between the direct and indirect real estate markets.’  
 
In order to examine this, a comparative analysis will be carried out. Companies with their 
core business in real estate investment in the mainland will be selected. Two categories of 
property companies will be distinguished according to their place of listing: Mainland 
China (the focus) and Hong Kong (as a control). The linkage between the mainland’s 
direct and indirect real estate markets will then be compared with the linkage between the 
mainland’s direct real estate market and those mainland real estate companies listed in 
Hong Kong. The underlying assets in both cases will be located in the mainland. Both 
types of companies will therefore be subject to the same set of economic and social 
factors. This will ensure that they share the same real estate risk associated with mainland 
investment the only exception being the place of listing, which will serve as a proxy for 
the corporate governance structure. This in turn means that the variables affecting any 
linkage will be constant except the variable of corporate governance structure. 
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 4.2. Methodology 
 
4.2.1. Correlation Test 
 
Correlation is a statistical technique to test the relationship between two sets of variables. 
Correlation coefficients (r) range from -1.00 to +1.00. The value of -1.00 represents a 
perfect negative correlation and the value of +1.00 represents a perfect positive 
correlation. If the correlation coefficient (r) is zero, there is no correlation between two 
sets of variables. The higher value of the correlation coefficient, the more correlated of 
the two sets of variables. 
 
The most widely-used type of correlation coefficient is Pearson. It was known as a linear 
or product-moment correlation. It assumes that two variables are measured on at least 
interval scales and they are linearly related. Thus, a line can be projected by scatter plot of 
each variable and called regression line or least square line. If the slope of the projected 
line is upward, the two variables are positive correlated and vice versa. 
 
In mathematical expression, the correlation coefficient (rxy) of two variables xi and yi can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
,where i from 0 to n 
 
The direct real estate performance and indirect real estate performance will be regarded as 
two sets of variables. The relationship between the direct and indirect real estate 
performances can be investigated by looking at the correlation coefficient (r) of them. In 
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 order to compare the correlation between direct and indirect real estate performances 
under different corporate governance structures, the following combinations would be 
tested:  
 
 
Variable xi  
(indirect real estate performance) 
Variable yi
(direct real estate performance) 
Shanghai Office Market 
 
 
Expected Result 
The magnitude of the correlation coefficient (r) in case i will be higher than the other two 
cases and all should be positive sign. As the case i represents the situation under higher 
level of Corporate Governance, the direct real estate performance would be more 
positively correlated with indirect real estate performance.  
Shenzhen Office Market 
Beijing Office market 
Case i 
(Under higher level of 
Corporate Governance)
Real Estate companies listed on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange 
Guangzhou Office Market 
Shanghai Office Market 
Shenzhen Office Market 
Beijing Office market 
Case ii 
(Under lower level of 
Corporate Governance)
Real Estate companies listed on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
Guangzhou Office Market 
Shanghai Office Market 
Shenzhen Office Market 
Beijing Office market 
Case iii 
(Under lower level of 
Corporate Governance)
Real Estate companies listed on Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange 
Guangzhou Office Market 
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 4.2.2. Cross Correlation Test 
 
Cross Correlation Test helps to determine the price discovery process and the lead lag 
relationship between the direct and indirect real estate performance. Cross Correlation is a 
kind of the correlation analysis which concerns the factor of the time. The coefficient of 
cross-correlation rxy(l) represents how strong of the relationship of the two variables in 
addition to the factor of time lag. The mathematical expression of the coefficient is as 
follows:  
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Based on the similar idea from previous Correlation Test, direct real estate performance 
and indirect real estate performance will be regarded as two sets of variables xi and yi.. For 
example, when the l was set to be +1, it will be regarded that the variable xi leads the 
variable yi by “one period” of time. When it was set to be -1, it will be regarded that 
variable yi leads variable xi by “one period” of time. The coefficient of the cross 
correlation represents the relationship of the two variables in the above situations. The 
lead-lag relationship can be determined by observing the values of coefficient of the result 
at each time. The higher value, the more correlated relationship between direct real estate 
performance and indirect real estate performance would have at that particular period. 
Similarly, in order to test whether better corporate governance structure would give a 
                                                 
6 Mathematical Expression is allocated in the Software EView 3.0 
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 faster and more responsive price discovery process, the same combinations of variables of 
the correlation test will be used. For the ranges of the lead lag period, it is suggested to be 
within Four Quarters. It is not only considering the result of previous research. It will be 
meaningless if the lead lag relationship have been longer than a year. 
 
Expected Result 
Previous research such as Newell and Chau (1996) and Newell at el (2005) indicated that 
the indirect real estate market reflects new information faster than that of direct real estate 
markets does. Thus, it is expected that all the indirect real estate performance lead the 
direct real estate performance. Furthermore, it is expected that the indirect real estate 
market in Hong Kong with better corporate governance structure would lead the direct 
real estate of Mainland China more than that of indirect real estate market of Mainland 
China does.  
 
4.2.3. Granger Causality Test 
 
Granger (1969) investigated the causality relations by the cross-spectral methods. 
Granger Causality Test helps to explain the relationship between two sets of variables xi 
and yi. It helps to find out which variable is causing the others. Since the previous cross 
correlation test only helps to determine how strong the relationship of the two variables in 
stead of establishing a causal relationship, Granger Causality Test helps to establish the 
lead lag relationship between two variables. 
 
Granger Causality Test attempted to answer the question of where xi causes yi. It was 
looking at how much of the current value of yi can be explained by past values of xi and 
then to see whether adding lagged values of xi can improve the explanation. Variable yi is 
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 said to be Granger-caused by xi if xi helps in the prediction of yi, or equivalently if the 
probability on the lagged xi are statistically significant. The two-way causation is 
frequently considered at the same time; xi Granger causes yi and yi Granger causes xi. In 
order to investigate the Granger Causes relationship, it was using the approach of 
rejecting the null hypothesis by generating the bivariate regressions of the form: 
 
here l represents the lagged period for all possible pairs of xi,yi series in the sample. 
he null hypothesis is therefore that xi does not Granger-cause yi in the first regression 
 order to investigate whether the indirect real estate performance causes the direct real 
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and that yi does not Granger-cause xi in the second regression.7 The smaller value of the 
probability obtained the higher statistically confident level to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
In
estate performance, or vice versa. It need to find out how much of the current direct real 
estate performance can be explained by past values of indirect real estate performance 
and then to see whether adding lagged values of indirect real estate performance can 
improve the explanation. Similarly, all the combination of the variables in the two 
previous tests would process the Granger Causality Test. Because of the approach of 
rejecting null hypothesis, the smaller value of the probability the more statistically 
significant will be regarded. This test provides a further explanation of causality 
relationships between direct and indirect real estate market. 
 
 
 
7 7 Mathematical Expression is allocated in the Software EView 3.0 
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 Expected Result 
hat the result of this test would be consistent with the cross correlation 
.2.4. Multi-factor Model 
he hypothesis can also be examined in an alternative way by constructing a multi-factor 
REITt = β0 + β1rSt + β2rBt + β3rREt + vt       (1) 
n 
ependent Variable 
n be replaced by the performance of the real estate companies due to 
dependent Variable 
ond and the direct real estate performance will be regarded as the 
It was expected t
test in order to provide a further explanation of causality relationships between direct and 
indirect real estate market.  
 
 
4
 
T
model. The relationship between the REIT returns and its major stock, bond and direct 
real estate returns can be adopted by replacing different sets of variables. The original 
equation constructed by Clayton et al (2003) is as follows: 
 
r
where rREITt represents the return to REIT; rst represents the return to stock market; rBt represents the retur
to bond market; rREt represents the return to direct real estate 
 
D
The REITs returns ca
the similar nature and characteristics. The indirect real estate performance will be 
regarded as an dependent variable in the regression model. 
 
In
The returns to stock, b
independent variables. 
 
 40
 In order to obtain “pure” and independent factors constituting the indirect real estate 
REt = δ + ηrBt + φrSt + εt          (2) 
he residual (εt) from the Ordinary Least Squares estimation of equation (2) represents a 
Indirect_RE = b0 + bSrSt + bBût + bREέt + vt      (4) 
otally three equations would be generated. One is focusing on Hong Kong listed real 
terpretation of Statistics 
actor regression model are to test the significant of the model 
performance, the factors in the equation (1) have to be orthogonalized before estimating 
the multi-factor model by following equations: 
 
r
rBt = ι + λέt + γrSt + ut          (3) 
 
T
“pure” direct real estate factor. While the residual (ut) from the equation (3) represents the 
“pure” bond factor. Thus, the resulted equation can be as follows: 
 
r
 
T
estate companies; the others are dealing with the situation in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
listed real estate companies. With the help of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
techniques, three regression models are estimated. The indirect real estate performance 
will be regressed on the three independent variables: pure direct real estate performance; 
pure stock performance and pure bond performance. The significance of the independent 
variables will be ascertained.  
 
In
The purposes of the multi-f
and the dependent variables, and it examine how the independent variables affect the 
dependent variable. The following items are the most common statistical interpretation 
that should be regarded: 
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Adjusted Coefficient of Determination (adjusted R²) 
 between the dependent variable and 
artial regression Coefficient (bi) 
es in dependent variable associated with a unit change 
Adjusted R² measure the strength of the association
the independent variables. If the adjusted R-squared equal to 0.80, it means that 80% of 
the change in dependent variable can be explained by the selected independent variables. 
 
P
The coefficient measures the chang
in independent variable holding all other factors constant. 
ii XbbC ++= ∑ ε0
 
ibX
C =∂
∂⇒
 
robability (p-value) 
ility of the null hypothesis that the independent variable does not 
xpected Result 
hat indirect real estate performance is more sensitive to direct real estate 
P
P-value is the probab
correlated to the dependent variable. If p-value is x %, it means that coefficient (bi) is 
statistically significant at (1-x %) confidence level. The independent variable has no 
effect on the dependent variable is less than x %. 
 
E
In order to show t
performance under better corporate governance structure, the coefficient of the 
independent variable – direct real estate performance should be compared among those 
three situations. The coefficient of the independent variable with higher value will be 
expected in the case of Hong Kong. 
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 4.2.5. Variance Decomposition Approach 
 
Variance decomposition will then be carried out to decompose the volatility of indirect 
real estate performance among three places. By employing the findings from Clayton et al 
(2003), the proportion of variance due to direct real estate can be derived as follows: 
 
By employing the Law of total variance, breaking down the total volatility of the indirect 
real estate returns into relative components common stock market, bond market, and 
direct real estate market. Thus, the variance of the indirect real estate market is: 
 
Var[rIndirect_RE] ≡  σ²Indirect_RE =  b²Sσ²rs + b²Bσ²u + b²REσ²ε +σ²v  (5) 
Where σ² represents the respective variance 
Then the proportion of variance of indirect real estate due to direct real estate can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 
REIndurect
REb
_
2
22
σ
σ ε   , where σ² represents the respective variance 
This proportion will be presented in a form of percentage which means that how much of 
the indirect real estate performance is due to its direct real estate market. In order to 
examine the hypothesis, the proportion of variance from the previous three models will be 
calculated for comparison.  
 
Expected Result 
It was expected that the proportion of variance due to direct real estate is higher in a 
market with better corporate governance structure. Thus, the proportion in the case of 
Hong Kong listed real estate companies would be higher than the others.  
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 4.3. Data Sources 
 
All the data used in above tests were regarded as the quarterly capital returns to that 
real e te ormance was turns to the real 
estate market indices of Mainland China. The required indices were constructed by a 
te companies with major businesses in Asian. “DTZ Index 
ndex Chinese Mainland 2003a” are collected 
for constructing the capital returns to the estate indices.  
 
indices of each area have also been covered. 
ill be 16 indices in total.  
4.3.1. Data Period 
 
particular sectors over twelve-year period of 1995:Q3 to 2006:Q2. 
 
4.3.2. Direct real estate performance 
 
Direct sta  perf assessed by the quarterly capital re
private property consultancy companies called Debenham Tie Leung (DTZ). DTZ is a 
global international real esta
Chinese Mainland Q2 2006” and the “DTZ I
The Chinese Mainland Real Estate Market Index is produced by the DTZ quarterly 
starting from 1991. The indices include four major cities in Mainland. The Office and 
Residential real estate sector from Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing and Guangzhou are 
included in these indices. The rental and price 
Thus, there w
 
By following the previous research Newell at el (2005), the returns to the office price 
indices from DTZ (Shown in Figure 4.3.2) are chosen to represent the direct real estate 
performance. These indices are complied by using the market value of mild-floor space in 
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 purpose-built building in the respective Central Business District (CBD). They are mainly 
based on the valuation method instead of the real transaction records due to the lack 
transaction record. The problem of using valuation-based indices will be significant when 
in a weak-from efficiency. The details are discussed in later 
. 
test, the returns to 
these four office price indices would be used to represents the direct real estate 
gression Model and variance decomposition, the 
our office price indices will be weighted average into an average direct real estate index. 
the real estate market is not 
chapter
 
In the Correlation test, Cross Correlation test and Granger Causality 
performance. But in the Multi-factor Re
f
The returns to this average real estate index would be used to represent the direct real 
estate performance.  
 
Figure 4.3.2 Returns to Office Price Indices 
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 4.3.3. Indirect Real Estate Performance of Hong Kong 
 
Indirect real estate performance of Hong Kong is measured by the returns to the listed 
real estate companies which are listed on HKEx and have core business in Mainland 
China Real Estate. There is no such index of these companies has been created by the 
KEx. Thus, a quarterly capital average weighted index has been constructed and the 
arket cap-weighted performance of all total 21 targeted companies8. 
hen the quarterly return to the newly constructed index would represent the indirect real 
ure 4.3.3) 
 
4.3.4. Indirect Real Estate Performance of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
 
The indirect real estate performance of Shanghai and Shenzhen are measured by the 
returns to the real estate companies which are listed on SSE and SZSE and have core 
business in Mainland China real estate. Both Real Estate Price Indices in these two stock 
exchanges are available and collected from the databases of DataStream. The SSE and 
SZSE have constructed the indices by the weighted capital value of the respective listed 
real estate companies. The SSE comprised the real estate index started from April 1993
hich consists of 21 real estate companies9 up to date. The SZSE comprised the real 
                                                
H
performance of real estate companies listed on HKEx is represented by the return to it.  
 
All the information such as the price of the equities and the number of shares are 
collected from the complicated database called the DataStream. The method of 
constructing such index is followed the ways of constructing the Hang Seng Index. The 
index comprises the m
T
estate performance of Hong Kong. (Shown in Fig
 
w
 
8 Appendix 1A 
9 Appendix 1B 
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 estate index started from January 1995 and it had reconstructed a new property index at 
uly 2001. There are total 20 real estate companies10 up to date. Simple conversion is 
 
J
carried out in order to construct an index from 1995 to 2006. Then the quarterly returns to 
these indices would represent the indirect real estate performance of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. (Shown in Figure 4.3.3) 
 
Figure 4.3.3Returns to Real Estate Companies 
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4.3.5. Stock Performance 
 
As all targeted real estate companies including those listing on HKEx are with the core 
business in mainland China’s real estate. Their underlying assets (direct real estate) from 
all these companies are located in Mainland China which are subject to the same set of 
economic and social factors. This ensures that the property companies in comparison are 
                                                 
10 Appendix 1C 
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 sharing the same real estate risk and affected by the same real estate market with the 
exception of the place of listing. Thus, Stock Performance in the three multi-factor 
models would be the same and represented by the capital weighted average returns to 
both SSE A shares index and SZSE A shares index. 
 
The SSE A shares index was constructed by the SSE from February 1992 while the SZSE 
m November 1992. All A-shares of the 
respective stock market were included in the indices. It actually reflects the whole 
dynamic situation of the A-shares stock market. Both SSE and SZSE A shares indices as 
well as the respective market capitalization are retrieved from the database of DataStream. 
The two indices would be merged into one weighted average index according to the 
market capitalization of each. The quarterly returns of this newly constructed index would 
represent the stock performance of the whole Mainland China Stock Market. (Shown in 
Figure 4.3.5) 
 
4.3.6. Bond Performance 
 
heoretically, the major bond performance should be represented by the Government’s 
sued bond. With the same reason explained in the previous paragraph, the bond 
 the major bond performance of China. The major bond 
erformance of China should be represented by the returns to the bonds issued by her. 
e U.S. government. And it was served as a risk free global investment 
A shares index was constructed by SZSE fro
T
is
performance should refer to
p
However, due to the limitation of collecting data and the short period for observation, this 
type of bond would not be used in this study. 
  
The U.S. Treasury Bill will be used to represent the Bond performance. The U.S. Treasury 
Bill is issued by th
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 vehicle for a long time with a relatively stable growth by itself. The quarterly pricing 
records will be collected from the DataStream. The returns to this ten years U.S. Treasury 
Bill will be adopted to represent the bond performance. (Shown in Figure 4.3.5) 
 
Figure 4.3.5 Returns to Stock and Bond Markets 
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 5. Empirical Results and Analyses  
 
5.1. Correlation Test 
 
The main purpose of this test is to determine whether direct real estate performance is 
more correlated with indirect real estate performance under a better corporate governance 
structure. Table 5.1.1 presents the results of correlation matrix for direct and indirect real 
estate performance of Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen over twelve-year period of 
1995:Q3 to 2006:Q2.  
 
The Shanghai real estate company sector was highly correlated with the Shenzhen real 
estate company sector (r = 0.90). It reflected that the indirect real estate markets between 
two places are affecting each other. While the Hong Kong real estate company sector is 
not as much correlated to Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company sectors. (r = 0.36 
and r = 0.37 respectively).  
 
The office markets of China are more correlated with the Hong Kong real estate company 
sector than that of Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company sectors. The results were 
more statistically significant in both Beijing’s office sector and Guangzhou’s office sector 
(r = 0.20 and r = 0.40 respectively). Those values against Hong Kong real estate company 
sector are much higher than that of Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company sectors. 
 
The results in Beijing and Guangzhou office markets supported the Author’s hypothesis. 
The Beijing and Guangzhou office sectors are more correlated to the Hong Kong real 
estate company sector than both Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company sectors. This 
implied that those real estate companies listed on HKEx have a more correlated 
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t more than that of the real estate companies 
ontrol empirical test, it supports the argument that a better 
 reflect more information from the direct real estate 
arket to indirect real estate market. 
 company sectors. (r = 0.30 and r = 0.29 
tively) 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate 
pany sectors and the Shenzhen office sector. This result partly rejected the Author’s 
panies.  
 
rela ionship with the direct real estate market 
listed in China. In this c
corporate governance structure can
m
 
However, there is no significant correlation between the Shanghai office market sector 
and the real estate companies sectors in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen. More 
importantly, there are significant correlation coefficients between Shenzhen office market 
and both Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate
respec
 
The results from the Shanghai ad Shenzhen office markets were out of the expectation. 
No evidence occurred of a strong relationship between the Hong Kong real estate 
company sector and both the Shanghai and Shenzhen office sector. However, there were 
some evidences of correlation between both 
com
hypothesis. And the reasons may be due to the differences of underlying asset portfolio 
between the Hong Kong and China real estate companies. Both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen real estate companies may have more underlying asset in Shenzhen than that of 
Hong Kong real estate companies. This argument may require further study in the natures 
and characteristics of the underlying asset portfolio of both Hong Kong and China real 
estate com
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able 5.1.1 Results of Correl
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
 
Results of Correlatio at
1995:Q3 – 2006  
H  G
 E  
p  
S NGH
Es
a
SHE H
R st
Co n
SHANGH
Office 
E
Of Off
G G U 
fi
GUANGZHOU Office 4 13 2 -0.0 0. 0.28 1 
ation Matrix : 1995:Q3 – 2006:Q2 
n M rix : 
:Q2
ONG KON  
Real state
Com anies
HA AI 
Real tate 
Comp nies 
NZ EN 
eal E ate 
mpa ies 
AI SH NZHEN 
fice 
BEIJING    
ice 
UAN ZHO
Of ce 
HONG KONG Real Estate Co e 1   mpani s      
SHANGHAI Real Estate Com s 3 1   panie 0. 6*    
SHENZHEN Real Estate Com s 3 0    panie 0. 7* 0.9 * 1  
SHANGHAI Office .0 09 7 1   -0 5 0.  0.0  
SHENZHEN Office .1 30 9 0.35*   0 0 0.  0.2 1 
BEIJING Office .2 2 4 0.35* 0. 1  0 0 0.0  0.0 36* 
0. 0* 0.  0.2
 
 
T
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 5.2. Cross Co n Test 
 
The main purposes of the Cross Correlation Test and Granger Causality Test were to 
determine whether better corporate governance would give a faster  more responsive 
price discovery process between the direct and indirect real estate market.  
 
Cross Correlati  has been carried out in order to inve ate the linkage between 
real estate com y sectors and office sectors. The lead-leg relationships between the 
three real estate company sectors and four office sectors have been found.  
 
In Table 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, no significant coefficient has been shown of a leading 
relationship by the real estate companies sectors and Shanghai and Shenzhen office 
markets. The oth Shanghai and She n o e m ets re with no help to 
explain the lead-lag relationship between direct and indirect real estate markets. However, 
th ult of t fice markets supported the Author’s hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.2.1 Result of Cr elation Test 
Direct real estate performance Lead-lag Peroid Indirect real estate performance 
rrelatio
and
on Test
pan
stig
 results of b  nzhe ffic ark  we
e res he other two of
oss Corr
  
H  Kong 
R Esta
Companies 
Shanghai  
 Est
Companies 
Shenzhen  
Real Estate 
Companies 
ong
eal te Real ate 
lead "+ 4 Quarter" 0.28 0.18 0.16 
lead "+ 3 Quar 0.08 -0.17 -0.16 ter"
lead "+ 2 Quar 0.21 0.15 0.08 ter"
lead "+ 1 Quar .16 .19 -0.12 ter" -0 -0
0 -0.05 09 0.07 0.
lag "- arte 11 .04 -0.01 1 Qu r" 0. -0
lag "- arte .03 01 0.05 2 Qu r" -0 0.
lag "- arte 0.09 -0.06 -0.10 3 Qu r" 
Shanghai O
g "- arte -0.01 0.11 0.09 
ffice 
la 4 Qu r" 
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 Notes  * Significant (p < 5%) :
Direct real estate performance Lead-lag Peroid Indirect real estate performance 
 
Table 5.2.2 Result of Cross Correlation Test 
  
Hong Kong 
Real Estate 
Shanghai  
Real Estate 
Shenzhen  
Companies Companies 
Real Estate 
Companies 
lead "+ 4 Quarter" 0.16 0.05 0.02 
lead "+ 3 Quarter" -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 
lead "+ 2 Quarter" 0.20 -0.17 -0.20 
lead "+ 1 Quarter" 0.22 0.03 0.11 
0 0.10 0.30 0.29 Shenzhen Office 
lag "-1 Quarter" 0.09 -0.10 -0.08 
lag "-2 Quarter" 0.16 0.11 0.18 
lag "-3 Quarter" 0.23 0.20 0.22 
lag "-4 Quarter" 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
 
 54
 There is evidence of leading relationship by the Hong Kong real estate company sector 
nd the Beijing office market. In the row (lag “-2 Quarter”) of the Table 5.2.3, There is a 
 
0.36). It seems that Hong Kong real estate co tor i he B e 
market up to two quarters. But no lead-lag re is fo en th a 
stock markets and the Beijing of  c lies with the result of the previous 
correlation test.  
 
 
Table 5.2.3 Result of Cross C  
Direct real estate performance Indirect real es ance 
a
significant correlation coefficient has been found in the Hong Kong real estate sector (r =
mpany sec
lationship 
s leading t eijing offic
und betwe e two Chin
fice. And this omp
orrelation Test
Lead-lag Peroid tate perform
  
Hong  
Real Estate 
Companies 
Sha
Real Estate 
Companies 
Sh
Real Estate 
Companies 
 Kong nghai  enzhen  
lead "+ 4 Quarter" 0.14 0.15 0.22 
lead "+ 3 Quarter" 0.32 0.16 0.19 
lead "+ 2 Quarter" 0.12 -0.14 -0.09 
lead "+ 1 Quarter" 0.20 0.11 0.16 
0 0.20 0.02 0.04 
lag "-1 Quarter" 0.26 0.01 0.07 
lag "-2 Quarter" 0.36* 0.04 0.16 
lag "-3 Quarter" -0.09 0.00 0.05 
Beijing Office 
lag "-4 Quarter" 0.21 -0.03 0.10 
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
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 In the Guangzhou office market, both the Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company 
sectors lead the office market. In the row “lag -2 Quarter” of the Table 5.2.4, there are 
significant coefficient of correlation has been found in both Shanghai and Shenzhen real 
estate company sectors (r = 0.32 and r = 0.48 respectively). However, there is no evidence 
that Hong Kong real estate companies have any leading relationship with the Guangzhou 
office market. 
 
Table 5.2.4 Result of Cross Correlation Test 
 estate performance Lead-lag Peroid Indirect real estate performance Direct real
    
Hong Kong 
Real Estate 
Compan
Shanghai  
Real Estate 
Shenzhen  
Real Estate 
panies ies Companies Com
lead "+ 4 Quarter" -0.16 0.07 -0.08 
lead "+ 3 Quarter" -0.17 -0.31 -0.19 
lead "+ 2 Quarter" 0.13 -0.01 -0.17 
lead "+ 1 Quarter" 0.22 0.19 0.21 
0 0.40 0.13 0.22 
lag "-1 Quarter" 0.23 
Guangzhou Office 
0.04 0.07 
lag "-2 Quarter" 0.03 0.32* 0.48* 
lag "-3 arter" Qu 0.21 0.11 0.15 
lag "-4 Quarter" 0.09 -0.16 -0.09 
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
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indirect real estate market performances, Granger Causality Tests had been 
arried out for explaining the causality relationship.  
T al  null hypo .2.5 and 
5.2.6. It shows that there is no causality relatio een ng th e 
companies and the Shanghai and Shenzhen of ports th
of Shanghai and Shenzhen of previous cross correlation test. As all the 
listed real estate companies in both Hong Kong and China have no or not much 
underlying assets in Shanghai of , no lead-lag relations
Moreover Shanghai an Shenzhen real estate com ay h ore 
underlying asset in Shenzhen of than t f Hong K al estate c nies 
have. Thus, it is reasonable to observe that Hong Kong has no lead-lag re ship 
between indirect real estate performance of Hong Kong and the direct real estate 
performance of Shenzhen.  
 
5.3. Granger Causality Test 
 
The Cross Correlation Tests only show how strong the relationship between two variables 
in certain lagged period. In order to prove the existences of lead-lag relationship between 
the direct and 
c
 
here is no significant p-v ue to reject the theses stated in the Table 5
nship has b
fice markets. It further sup
found amo e real estat
e results 
fice sectors in the 
fice sector hip would be found. 
, both the d panies m ave m
fice sector hat o ong re ompa
lation
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able 5.2.5 Result of Granger Causality Tests 
Result Granger Causality Tests         
Shanghai Office Market       
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2 L 1 Lags: 2  : 4Q ags: Q Q Lags: 3Q Lags
  Null Hypothesis: P b ab ab abilityroba ility Prob ility Prob ility Prob  
  Shanghai Office does not Granger Cause Hong g  E  C an 0  0.2079 8 68   Kon  Real state omp ies .3058   0.256   0.11
  Hong Kong Real Estate Companies does not G er g f 0.  0.7591 3 15  rang  Cause Shan hai O fice 4763   0.864   0.95
  Shanghai Office does not Granger Cause Shan R st o ie 0.  0.3971 6 63  ghai eal E ate C mpan s 2484   0.342   0.40
  Shanghai Real Estate Companies does not Gra S a c 0.  0.9640 8 28  nger Cause hangh i Offi e 8239   0.964   0.94
  Shanghai Office does not Granger Cause Shenzhen R st o ie 0.  0.6485 2 69  eal E ate C mpan s 4255   0.454   0.35
  Shenzhen Real Estate Companies does not Granger C e Sha ghai ic 0.  0.9383 7 85  aus n  Off e 9897   0.913   0.89
Table 5.2.6 Result of Granger Causality Tests 
Result Granger Causality Tests         
Shenzhen Office Market       
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2 L 1 Lags: 2  3 s: 4Q ags: Q Q Lags: Q Lag
  Null Hypothesis: P bility Probability ab babilityroba Prob ility Pro
  Shenzhen Office does not Granger Cause Hong Kong   a 0.  0.2115  6 37   Real Estate Comp nies 1546  0.271   0.33
  Hong Kong Real Estate Companies does not Granger z Of 0.  0.4412  3 35   Cause Shen hen fice 5484  0.233   0.34
  Shenzhen Office does not Granger Cause Shanghai R st o ie 0.  0.4570  0 68  eal E ate C mpan s 7639  0.628   0.77
  Shanghai Real Estate Companies does not Granger C S e c 0.  0.3654  5 98  ause henzh n Offi e 3230  0.516   0.61
  Shenzhen Office does not Granger Cause Shenzhen R s o i 0.  0.3307  1 02  eal E tate C mpan es 5876  0.631   0.82
  Shenzhen Real Estate Companies does not Granger C e Sh he fi 0  0.1844  8 368  0.476   0.6aus enz n Of ce .3838  
 
 
T
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
 For the Beijing office market, the previous cross correlation test has shown that there is a 
relationship between Hong Kong real estate company sector and the Beijing office market. 
The Ho o  sector lead p to two 
quarters. In order to further confirm this leading relationship, the result of Granger 
Causality T e Ta  
significant p-value has been found in the 6). This 
significant p-value rejected e ypothesis o
does not G fice”. It m s
compan a ijing office  alid after 
two quarters. There is no evidence showing that both the Shanghai and Shenzhen real 
estate company sectors have causality relationship with Beijing office market. By 
combing the previous results from the cross correlation test, it can conclude that Hong 
Kong real estate companies lead the Beijing office market up to two quarters. It further 
supports the Author’s hypothesis that indirect real estate performance would have a faster 
pricing discover orporate governanc
 
The previous cross correlation test has shown that there are significant correlation 
coefficients between both Shanghai and Shenzhen rea any sectors and 
fi er confirm this the result 
u ined. In column f ble 5.2.8, 
here is no sign  he null hypoth  al Estate 
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 “Lag: 2Q” is significant and confirm that Shenzhen real estate companies are leading 
Guangzhou office market for two quarters. The significant p-value (p = 0.0054) is 
sufficient statistically confident to reject the null hypothesis of “Shenzhen Real Estate 
Companies does not Granger Cause Guangzhou Office”. That means that the Shenzhen 
real estate company sector is causing the Guangzhou office market and the effect would 
be valid after two quarters.  
 
In the previous Cross Correlation Test, there is no statistically significant result indicating 
that Hong Kong real estate company sector has leading relationship with Guangzhou 
office market. The conclusion is different when considering the result of the Granger 
Causality Test. In the column “Lags: 4Q” of the Table 5.2.8, statistically significant 
p-values (p = 0.0384 and p= 0.0782) have been found and they rejected both the null 
hypotheses of. “Guangzhou Office does not Granger Cause Hong Kong Real Estate 
Companies” and “Hong Kong Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause 
Guangzhou Office”. Significant evidence showed that both direct and indirect real estate 
arkets are causing each other and it is up to four quarters. “Feedback” phenomenon has m
been occurred in the fourth quarter. Thus, it can simply say that Hong Kong has a leading 
relationship with Guangzhou office market up to four quarters.  
 
When there is a “shock” that means the flow of relevant information of the real estate, the 
indirect real estate market will usually reflect the information faster than the direct one. 
By comparing the lead-lag relationship of the indirect and direct real estate market of 
Hong Kong and China, the price discovery process of them can also be found. From the 
above results, two quarters lead-lag relationship had been found between the Hong Kong 
real estate company sector and the Beijing office market. And a four quarters lead-lag 
relationship was discovered between the Hong Kong real estate company sector and 
 60
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Author’s hypothesis.  
 
Guangzhou office market. While the Shanghai and Shenzhen real estate company sectors 
had only led the Guangzhou office markets up to two quarters. By comparing the results, 
it can conclude that the Hong Kong real estate company sector (represents a better 
Corporate Governance Structure) can reflect the information faster than that of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen real estate company sectors (represents a poorer Corporate Governance 
Structure). And this further supports the 
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able 5.2.7 Result of Granger Causality Tests 
Result Granger Causality Tests         
Beijing Office Market       
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2 Lags: 1Q Lags: 2Q s: s:Lag  3Q Lag  4Q 
  Null Hypothesis: Probability Probability a aProb bility Prob bility
  Beijing Office does not Granger Cause Hong Kong Real Estate Companies 0.1718 0.5747 90 36 0.41  0.69  
  Hong Kong Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Beijing Office 0.1044 0.0163* 0 4* 0 1*.018 .024
  Beijing Office does not Granger Cause Shanghai Real Estate Companies 0.4759 0.4293 57 35 0.47  0.52  
  Shanghai Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Beijing Office 0.9284 0.9509 79 82 0.99  0.99  
  Beijing Office does not Granger Cause Shenzhen Real Estate Companies 0.2899 0.3042 35 98 0.22  0.31  
  Shenzhen Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Beijing Office 0.6054 0.5455 36 39 0.82  0.94  
Table 5.2.8 Result of Granger Causality Tests 
Result Granger Causality Tests         
Guangzhou Office Market       
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2 Lags: 1Q Lags: 2Q s: s:Lag  3Q Lag  4Q 
  Null Hypothesis: Probability Probability a aProb bility Prob bility
  Guangzhou Office does not Granger Cause Hong Kong Real Estate Companies 0.0982* 0.3691 81 0 4* 0.15  .038
  Hong Kong Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Guangzhou Office 0.1090 0.3049 31 2*0.13  0.078
  Guangzhou Office does not Granger Cause Shanghai Real Estate Companies 0.2027 0.4661 7* 150.095 0.22  
  Shanghai Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Guangzhou Office 0.8043 0.1177 86 590.17  0.19  
  Guangzhou Office does not Granger Cause Shenzhen Real Estate Companies 0.2112 0.2384 25 810.30  0.45  
  Shenzhen Real Estate Companies does not Granger Cause Guangzhou Office 0.6937 0.0054* 0 5* 0 6*.015 .045
 
 
T
Notes: * Significant (p < 5%) 
 5.4. Multi-factor Model 
 
The main p regression m e irect 
real estate performance being more sensitive to the direct real estate performance under 
better Corp o c odels a  p nship 
between the indirect real estate performance and direct real estate performance with the 
consideratio o t . 
 
Three regression m e ated by adopting the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) technique. And all factors of the equations (4) have been orthogonalized by using 
the equation (2) and (3). The residuals of these two equations are being the “pure” factors 
of the equation (4). For the means of clear presentation, the result of the regression of 
equation 2 and 3 are presented as follows: 
 
Table 5.3.1Regression Model from the equation 2 
Dependent Variable: DI T
urpose of making multi-factor od ls is to test whether the ind
orate G vernance Stru ture. The m lso hel  to explain the relatio
ns f the equity marke  factors
odels have be n estim
RECT_REAL ES ATE  
Method: Least Squares    
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2     
Included observations:  44  
     
Variable ror t-Statistic Coefficient Std. Er Prob. 
     
BOND_PERFORMAN 90 0.040901 CE 0.001762 0.0430 0.9676 
STOCK_PERFORMAN 57 0.772371 C 0.021748 0.0281 0.4443 
C -0.003568 0.004089 -0.872719 0.3879 
     
R-squared t r 0.014971 Mean dependen  va -0.00300 
Adjusted R-squared -0.033079 S.D. dependent var 0.026176 
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 Dependent Variable: BOND_PERFORMANCE  
Method: Least Squares    
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2    
Included observations: 44    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
PURE_DIRECT_RE 1.06E-12 0.566033 1.87E-12 1.0000 
STOCK_PERFORMANC 0.101700 0.100810 1.008832 0.3190 
C -0.006725 0.014782 -0.454974 0.6515 
     
R-squared 0.024222 Mean dependent var -0.004021 
Adjusted R-squared -0.023377 S.D. dependent var 0.095319 
The residual of the equation (3) was used to represent the Pure Bond performance factor to the equation (4). The explanation can be 
 
After the process of orthogonalization, pure factors such as direct real estate performance, 
bond performance and stock performance a
referred to the methodology part. 
re obtained. And the three multi-factor models 
have been constructed. 
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 Table 5.3.3 presents the Hong Kong’s multi-factor model with the adjusted R-squared 
means that 22% of the cha ge in indire t real estate performance of 
explained by the selected variables. All the three independent 
 with the dependent variable. It means that 
ll these independent var bles have he positive association with the dependent variables. 
From the result of the test, the p-value of the stock performance independent variable and 
ect real estate perform p aria rge that 10% which is not 
tistically signif cant. The e of pure bond performance variable is 
ficant l Further  direct real estate 
.7127). The indirect real estate companies in Hong Kong are more sensitive to the direct 
Table 5.3.3 Hong Kong’s multi-factor model 
ependent Variable: HONG KONG_INDIRECT REAL ESTATE 
equal to 0.22 which n c
Hong Kong can be 
variables have the positive sign of coefficients
a ia  t
dir ance inde endent v ble are la r than 
very sta i  p-valu
statistically signi which is esser than 5%. more, the
performance has the largest coefficient among those three independent variables. (c = 
1
real estate performance than those stock and bond performances. 
 
 
D
Method: Least Squares    
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2    
Included observations: 44   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
PURE_STOCK 0.343200 0.215394 1.593356 0.1190  
PURE_BOND 1.071580 0.333688 3.211327 0.0026  
PURE_DIRECT_REAL ESTATE 1.712664 1.209410  1.416114 0.1645  
C 0.043380 0.031584 1.373469 0.1773 
     
R-squared 0.270829 Mean dependent var 0.052506 
Adjusted R-squared 0.216141 S.D. dependent var 0.232708 
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 Table 5.3.4 has shown the Shanghai’s multi-factor model with the adjusted R-squared 
equal to 0.72 which means that 72% of the change in indirect real estate performance of 
Shanghai can be explained by the selected variables. All three independent variables have 
the positive sign of the coefficient with the dependent variable. Only the p-value of the 
stock market performance independent variable is significant at 5% level. The other two 
independent variables do not show any significant p-value. More importantly, the 
coefficient of the Bond performance is at a low value (c = 0.0053). It means that the bond 
performance doesn’t affect the indirect real estate performance so much. And it can be 
concluded that the indirect real estate market of Shanghai are more sensitive to the direct 
real estate market and the stock market (with the coefficient, c = 0.7874 and c = 0.9299 
respectively) than the bond performance. 
 
Table 5.3.4 Shanghai’s multi-factor model 
Dependent Variable: SHANGHAI_INDIREC REAL ESTATE 
Method: Least Squares    
Sample: 1995: 006:2  3 2   
Included observations: 44   
     
Variable Coefficient td. Error Statistic rob.   S t- P
     
PURE_STOCK .929946 .087639 0.61111 .0000  0 0 1 0
PURE_BOND 0.005305 0.135770  0.039071 0.9690  
PURE_DIRECT_REAL ESTATE .787419 .492081 .600182 .1174  0 0 1 0
C -0.015536 0.012851 -1.20893 0.2338  
     
R-squared 0.742198 Mean dependent var 0.009193 
Adjusted R-squared den 8 0.722863 S.D. depen t var 0.15923
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 Table 5.3.5 presented the Shenzhen’s multi-factor model with the adjusted R-squared 
equal to 0.78 which means that about 78% of the change in indirect real estate 
performance of Shenzhen can be explained by the selected variables. All three 
independent variables have the positive sign of the coefficient with the dependent variable. 
The p-value of the stock market performance independent variable and direct real estate 
market performance independent variable are both significant at 5% level. The 
coefficients of these two independent variables are equal to 1.2311 and 1.1315 
respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: SHENZHEN_INDIREC REAL ESTATE 
Table 5.3.5 Shenzhen’s multi-factor model 
Method: Least Squares    
Sample: 1995:3 2006:2    
Included observations: 44   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
PURE_STOCK 1.231095 .101361  .145610  .0000  0 12 0
PURE_BOND 0.162997 0.157029  038010  .3055  1. 0
PURE_DIRECT_REAL ESTATE .131517 .569131  988149  .0537  1 0 1. 0
C -0.009160 0.014863  -0.616291  0.5412  
     
R-squared 0.792257 Mean dependent var 0.023577 
Adjusted R-squared n0.776677 S.D. depende t var 0.205165 
 
 
 
 
 67
 5.4.1. Direct real estate performance 
 
The coefficient of the variable direct real estate performance (bRE) represents the 
sensitivity of the indirect real estate market to direct real estate market. By comparing the 
results from the three models, the value of bRE in the Hong Kong multi-factor model is 
higher than that of the other two models. This result supports the Author’s hypothesis and 
demonstrates that the corporate governance structure has the positive effect on the 
sensitivity of the indirect real estate performance to direct real estate performance. That 
lso implies that the real estate companies listed on equity market is more sensitive to the 
vernance Structure. The sensitivity of 
 is also higher under a better Corporate Governance Structure.  
.4.2. Stock and Bond performance 
ai’s and Shenzhen a , a icant p-value 
nc e t ir estate market 
rformance are strongly correla  c r e. The results 
tent with the previous research such as Lang and
rolyi and Sand ) efficients of the independent 
ariable bond performance are in a very small value especially in the Shanghai and 
henzhen market. And the results are acceptable because the bond performance is using 
reasury Bill which is not a local government issued bond from the 
targeted location. Thus, it is reasonable that the indirect real estate performance does not 
correlate with this U.S. Government issued bond. However, it was surprising that the 
result of the Hong Kong multi-factor model is correlated with the U.S. Treasury Bill. This 
may be explained that the Hong Kong listed real estate companies may invest in this 
a
direct real estate market under a better Corporate Go
the information flow
 
5
 
In the Shangh ’s multi-f ctor model the statistic lly signif
of the stock market performa e variabl represents hat the ind ect real 
pe ted to the overall sto k market pe formanc
are consis  Naranjo (1997), Peterson and 
Hseih (1997), Ka ers (1998 . However, the co
v
S
the returns to the U.S. T
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 Bond as a part of its investment portfolio. Thus, it results in a correlation between the U.S. 
reasury Bill and the Hong Kong real estate company performance. This argument would 
rts in 
e R-squared value can be explained by the other factors such as the overall investment 
market. And this has not been identified in this 
tudy. Further studies are recommended on those areas in order to have the full 
T
require further studies on these areas 
 
5.4.3. Coefficient of Determination 
 
The values of the adjusted R-squared of the Shanghai’s and Shenzhen’s multi-factor 
models are relatively much higher than that of the Hong Kong’s multi-factor model. They 
are both higher than 70%. But the extremely low value of the Hong Kong’s model 
represented that the chosen independent variables only helps to explain a small proportion 
of the performance of the Hong Kong real estate company sector. The remaining pa
th
environment in the Hong Kong stock 
s
understanding of the factors affecting the performance of Hong Kong real estate company 
sector.  
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 5.5. Variance Decomposition Approach 
 
The main purpose of calculating the proportion of variance is determining how much of 
e indirect real estate performance is due to its direct real estate market performance. 
l performance of three places have been calculated 
nd summarized in the Table 5.4.1. From the result of the three multi-factor models, 
Table 5.4.1Results of Variance Decomposition 
 
 Hong Kong Shanghai Shenzhen 
th
Variance of both direct and indirect rea
a
variance decomposition has been carried out and the proportion of variance due to direct 
real estate has also been found. The results are within the expectation; the proportion of 
variance due to direct real estate in the Hong Kong multi-factor model is the highest 
(3.6557%). That means 3.65575% of the performance of Hong Kong real estate company 
sector is constituted by the direct real estate market. A larger percentage of the indirect 
real estate performance is constituted by the direct real estate performance. This result 
supports the Author’s hypothesis that indirect real estate performance is more correlated 
to the direct real estate performance under better corporate governance structure.  
 
REIndirect _
2σ  0.0542 0.0254 0.0421 
εσ 2  0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
REb2  2.9332 0.6200 1.2803 
REIndurect
REb
_
2
22
σ
σ ε
 3.6557% 1.6503% 2.0529% 
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 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1. Summary of Study 
 
This study gave a general review on the corporate governance structures in both Hong 
Kong and Mainland China. It has examined the impact from the two different sets of 
Corporate Governance Structure on the direct and indirect linkage of real estate markets 
over 1995:Q3 -2006:Q2 period. The empirical results confirm that better corporate 
governance structure would result in a more correlated linkage between direct and 
indirect real estate market performance as well as a faster and sensitive price discovery 
process.  
 
6.2. Implications of Study 
 
The findings highlighted the importance of the corporate governance and its positive 
impacts on the linkage between direct and indirect real estate markets.  
For the institutional in roperty e Hong K tock 
Exchange would be a better indirect real estate investment vehicle for exploring the direct 
real estate market in Mainland China. The better corporate governance structure in Hong 
Kong stock market makes the performanc ese compa ing more c d to 
the performance of the office market in China than that of the property companies in 
Mainland China. The institutional investors can invest in the property companies in Hong 
ong and retain a higher degree of exposure to the direct real estate market in Mainland 
China at the same time. Prediction of the direct real estate market performance in 
Mainland China can be made by analyzing the performance of these companies.  
 
vestors, p  companies listed on th ong S
e of th nies be orrelate
K
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 For the regulators (Securities and Futures Commission, Government, Monetary Authority 
tc.) and participants (Hong Kong Stock Exchange) in Hong Kong, the findings raise the 
r overnance. The higher level of corporate governance gives a 
ster and more responsive price discovery process from the indirect real estate market to 
n (CSSC); The Ministry of Finance and the Government etc) and participants ( 
hanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) in Mainland China, there is an 
 the corporate governance structure in order to increase the 
ompetitiveness of the stock market. Real estate market of Mainland China has been put 
y to invest in the 
direct real estate market than the direct real estate market due to the difference in 
cess of 
e
impo tance of corporate g
fa
direct real estate market, this would attract more foreign investors to invest in the real 
estate companies in Hong Kong as an exposure to the real estate market in Mainland 
China. Thus, they should continue to retain this superior advantage and improve the 
corporate governance structure of Hong Kong.  
 
For the regulators (State Securities Committee (SSC); China Securities Supervisory 
Commissio
S
urgent need for the reform of
c
into many global real estate institutional investors’ next agenda because of the significant 
economical growth of the country. Those fund managers are more likel
in
liquidity. The poor corporate governance structure in China stock market would be an 
obstacle for those investors. The regulators and participants should firstly resolve the 
problem of information disclosure and transparency by a more workable legislative 
control and rectify the problem of government owning too much shares of the companies. 
 
For the property companies listed on the two China stock markets, the findings indicate 
that they are in inferior situation. They should increase the level of corporate governance 
of the company itself. Voluntary action can be taken such as frequently disclosure of 
“real” financial report, increasing the transparency of the Board and the pro
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 making decision. As the result, the increased corporate governance level would definitely 
attract the foreign investors to invest in and make further expansions of the companies 
themselves.  
 
6.3. Limitation of Study 
 
In the empirical tests, lead-lag relationship between the direct and indirect real estate 
market performances have been investigated. It was preferable to have large amount of 
ampling of data for the observation in order to estimate a more accurate result. The 
ang LaSalle (JLL, 2003b) have produced another China office real estate series, but it 
s
quarterly recorded data from 1995:Q3 to 2006:Q2 are not long enough to have a result 
with highly confident. A longer period for the observation can provide us with a more 
accurate result. 
 
Secondly, it refers to the reliability of the sources of the data used in this study. The direct 
real estate market performance was only represented by the office price indices produced 
from a private consultant companies. The DTZ Chinese Mainland real estate index is the 
core material for all the empirical tests in this study. The valuation-based indices would 
lead the problem of appraisal smoothing which has been reflected in the result of low 
serial correlation between the direct real estate markets itself. It should be tackled by 
unsmoothing technologies (Barkham and Gelter, 2004). Also, it can increase the validity 
and reliability of the data by using one more set of data for cross checking. The Jones 
L
only covered a shorter period and fewer places. A more accurate result will be achieved if 
further study can overcome these two problems. 
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 Lastly, it refers to the selection of appropriate data. The Bond performance of the 
multi-factor model should refer to the Bonds issued by China’s Government. The U.S. 
Treasury Bill has been adopted to represent the bond performance of both Hong Kong and 
hina due to the limitation of data collection. A confident result will be achieved by 
c Bill by bonds issued by the Chinese government.  
rty market and industrial property market. Further research can be done 
y investigating the linkage between the direct and indirect real estate market 
 
C
repla ing the U.S. Treasury 
 
6.4. Further Study 
 
This research simply followed the previous research and only used the returns to the 
office price indices to represent the direct real estate market performance. Actually, the 
listed real estate companies may have underlying asset which specially focus on 
residential prope
b
performances by dividing the listed real estate companies into three categories. It suggests 
that the listed real estate companies should be categorized according to the natures of 
their underlying assets (residential, commercial and industrial). A more accurate result 
will be obtained if the performances of these three categorized indirect real estate 
companies groups are compared with the respective types of direct real estate 
performances.  
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1A - Real Estate Companies listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Real Estate Companies listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Company Name   No. ing 
  
List Date 
NEW HERITAGE HOLDINGS LTD 新澤控股有限公司 (0095.HK) 95 05 00 Dec-
GUANGZHOU INVESTMENT CO. LTD 越秀投資有限公司 (0123.HK) 23 93 01 Jan-
TOMSON GROUP 湯臣集團有限公司 (0258.HK) 58 88 02 Jun-
SHUI ON GROUP 瑞安房地產有限公司 (0272.HK) 72 02 Oct-06 
SPG LAND (HOLDING) LIMITED 盛高置地(控股)有限公司 (0337.HK) 3703  N/A 
FORTUNE SUN (CHINA) HOLDINGS 富陽(中國)控股有限公司 (0352.HK) 52 -06 03 Aug
BEIJING NORTH STAR COMPANY LIMITED 北京北辰實業股份有限公司 (0588.HK) 88 97 05 Jun-
SHIMAO INTERNATIONAL 世茂國際控股有限公司 (0649.HK) 49 -98 06 Aug
HOPEFLUENT REAL PROPERTIES 合富輝煌集團控股有限公司 (0733.HK) 33 -04 07 Aug
HOPSON DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD 合生創展集團有限公司 (0754.HK) 54 98 07 Jun-
SHIMAO PROPERTY 世茂房地產控股有限公司 (0813.HK) 13 -06 08 Aug
NEW WORLD CHINA LAND 新世界中國地產有限公司 (0917.HK) 17 -99 09 Aug
CHINA RESOURCES LAND LIMITED 華潤置地有限公司 (1109.HK) 09 96 11 Dec-
CGL COASTAL 沿海綠色家園有限公司 (1124.HK) 24 -97 11 Nov
SINOLINK WORLD HOLDINGS LTD 百仕達控股有限公司 (1168.HK) 68 98 11 Jul-
SHANGHAI REAL ESTATE LTD 上海置業有限公司 (1207.HK) 07 00 12 Jan-
SHANGHAI FORTE LAND CO. 復地(集團)股份有限公司 (2337.HK) 37 -04 23 Mar
 82
 R&F PROPERTIES GROUP 廣州富力地產股份有限公司 (2777.HK) 2777 Aug-05 
BEIJING CAPITAL LAND 首創置業股份有限公司 (2868.HK) 2868 Jul-03 
AGILE PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD 雅居樂地產控股有限公司 (3383.HK) 3383 Jan-06 
GREENTOWN CHINA HOLDINGS LTD 綠城中國控股有限公司 (3900.HK) 3900 Aug-06 
  Note: The source is author’s compilation from www.hkex.com.hk 
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 Appendix 1B - Real Estate Companies listed in Shanghai Stock
ai Stock Exchange 
 Exchange 
Real Estate Companies listed in Shangh       
Company Name   No. Listing Date 
保利房地产（集团）股份有限公司 600048 Jul-06 POLY REAL ESTATE GROUP CO. LTD 
JIANGXI ZHONGJIANG REAL ESTATE CO.,LTD 江西中江地产股份有限公司 600053 Apr-97 
TIANJIN REALITY DEVELOPMENT (GROUP) CO. LTD 天津市房地产发展（集团）股份有限公司 600322 Sep-01 
ZHUHAI HUAFA INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD 珠海华发实业股份有限公司 600325 Feb-04 
BEIJING TIANHONG BAOYE REAL ESTATE CO.,LTD. 北京天鸿宝业房地产股份有限公司 600376 Mar-01 
GEMDALE CORPORATION 金地（集团）股份有限公司 600383 Apr-01 
GUANGZHOU DONGHUA ENTERPRISE CO.LTD. 广州东华实业股份有限公司 600393 Mar-01 
BEIJING AIRPORT HIGH-TECH PARK CO. LTD. 北京空港科技园区股份有限公司 600463 Mar-04 
NANJING CHIXIA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 南京栖霞建设股份有限公司 600533 Mar-02 
SHANGHAI XINGYE HOUSING CO., LTD 上海兴业房产股份有限公司 600603 Jan-92 
SHANGHAI HAI NIAO ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 上海海鸟企业发展股份有限公司 600634 Mar-93 
SHANGHAI NEW HUANG PU REAL ESTATE CO.,LTD. 上海新黄浦置业股份有限公司 600638 Mar-93 
SHANGHI JINQIAO EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE 
DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD. 
上海金桥出口加工区开发股份有限公司 600639 Mar-93 
SHANGHAI WANYE ENTERPRISES CO.,LTD. 上海万业企业股份有限公司 600641 Apr-93 
SHANGHAI WAI GAOQIAO FREE TRADE ZONE 
DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD. 
上海外高桥保税区开发股份有限公司 600648 May-93 
SHANGHAI LUJIAZUI FINANCE & TRADE ZONE 
DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD 
上海陆家嘴金融贸易区开发股份有限公司 600663 Jun-93 
 84
 TANDE CO.,LTD. 天地源股份有限公司 600665 N/A 
CHINA ENTERPRISE COMPANY LIMITED 中华企业股份有限公司 600675 Sep-93 
GUANGZHOU PEARL RIVER INDUSRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
广州珠江实业开发股份有限公司 84 N  
CO.,LTD. 
6006 /A
TIANCHUANG PROPERIY CO.LTD 天创置业股份有限公司 600791 Jan-97 
SHANGHAI NO.1 PHARMACY CO.,LTD. 上海第一医药股份有限公司 600833 Feb-94 
 Note: The source is author’s compilation from www.sse.com.cn 
 85
 Appendix 1C - Real Estate Companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Ex
  
change 
Real Estate Companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Company Name  . Listing Date  No
VANKE-A N/A 000002 Jan-91 
ZHENYE N/A 000006 Apr-92 
SEG.DASHENG N/A 000007 Apr-92 
SHAHE INDUSTRY N/A 000014 Jun-92 
CMPD N/A 000024 Jun-93 
SPG N/A 000029 Sep-93 
COFCO PROPERTY N/A 000031 Oct-93 
SHENCHANGCHENG N/A 000042 Sep-94 
OCG N/A 000046 Sep-94 
FINANCIAL STREET N/A 000402 Jun-96 
LJR N/A 000502 Nov-92 
HN PEARL RIVER N/A 000505 Dec-92 
INGIN N/A 000511 May-93 
YUKAIFA N/A 000514 Jul-93 
GUANGHUA HOLDING N/A 000546 Dec-93 
SUPERSHINE N/A 000608 Sep-96 
YELAND N/A 000616 Nov-96 
HI-TECH DEVELOPMENT N/A 000628 Nov-96 
CELEBRITIES N/A 000667 Dec-96 
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 BOHAI LOGISTICS N/A 000889 Dec-97 
 Note: The source is author’s compilation from www.szse.cn 
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